Armed Revolutionary Nuclei

Armed Revolutionary Nuclei via http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants

Formed	October 1977
Disbanded	1988
First Attack	December 24, 1977: NAR members wounded a leftist student in Rome (0 killed, 1 wounded).[1]
Last Attack	August 14, 1988: NAR members unsuccessfully attempted to bomb police headquarters in Milan (0 killed).[2]
Updated	April 24, 2012

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR) was the largest and most violent right-wing terrorist organization in Italy during the second half of the 1970s.[3] It was responsible for several individual murders as well as the worst terrorist attack in post-War Italian history, a bombing in a Bologna train station that killed 85.[4] It formed in part to coordinate the right-wing militants scattered after authorities banned the three main neo-fascist militant groups in the mid-1970s.[5] NAR differed a great deal from its predecessors in its goals, structure, and attitude toward the left.

Some of NAR's founding documents deride the failure of the early right-wing militant groups of the post-World War II period, the most prominent among them being New Order, Black Order, and National Front. In particular, NAR's founders rejected those groups' focus on  staging a coup against the Italian government and replacing it with a fascist regime.[6] NAR instead embraced a less well-defined anti-state program of undermining the state through widespread violence.

NAR to that end had a fluid and less-hierarchical structure than its predecessors, and in some respects was less a real organization than a name. It had leaders but also encouraged the use of its name to claim any attacks with a revolutionary purpose.[7] Among its more formal membership, it embraced a program of "armed spontaneity," where attacks would not necessarily be planned and organized from a central authority.[8] In this it mirrored the leftist militant organizations of the second half of the 1970s, who similarly rejected the hierarchical organization of earlier groups on their side.[9]

NAR was neo-fascist but not explicitly anti-Communist, and on several occasions attempted to strike an alliance with left-wing groups. Left-wing groups did not respond to these overtures, however.

The group declined rapidly throughout the 1980s due to arrests tied to the Bologna train station massacre. Its decline was also hastened by internal fighting as members became increasingly concerned about informants.[10] In a pattern typical of both left- and right-wing groups, arrested members often cooperated with authorities, leading to the arrest of more group members. However weakened, the group continued to claim attacks until 1988.[11]

LEADERSHIP

1. Dario Pedretti (Unknown to Unknown): Pedretti was NAR's theorist.[12]
2. Francesca Mambro (1979 to Unknown): Mambro was the daughter of a policeman. She named the organization and led NAR's "women nucleus."[13]
3. Giusva Fioravanti (1979 to February 1981): Giusva Fioravanti was the main leader of NAR. He was one of its chief advocates of spontaneous, as opposed to organized, action. He committed around 10 murders over the course of his career in terrorism and was involved in the Bologna train station bombing that killed 85. He was wounded and arrested in a shootout with police in 1981.[14]
4. Cristiano Fioravanti (1979 to April 1981): Cristiano Fioravanti was the brother of NAR's main leader, Giusva. He became an informant for police after his arrest in 1981.[15]

IDEOLOGY & GOALS

• Neo-fascist
• Right wing

NAR identified itself as a fascist group. In addition to the traditional Italian fascist texts, NAR and other fascist militant groups of the second half of the 1970s were especially influenced by the fantasy writings of J.R.R. Tolkien, whose Lord of the Ring series was thought to exemplify such traditionally fascist themes as heroism.[16]

NAR was not explicitly anti-Communist, however. The group did fight left-wing groups on occasion, but it also sought to unite all anti-state groups and several times tried unsuccessfully to join forces, or at least cease hostilities, with the left.[17] This represented an ideological break with the previous generation of Italian right-wing militant groups.

NAR also rejected the goal of earlier fascist groups to stage a coup. Its precise goals regarding the shape of a future Italian state were not clear.[18] This was in part because NAR's membership was younger than that of the first generation Italian fascist groups and had not actually lived under or fought on behalf of the fascist state in Italy.[19] It was also in part because NAR encouraged the use of its name to claim attacks not formally affiliated to its organization but having a revolutionary purpose.[20]

RESOURCES

NAR, like left-wing groups, largely supported itself through robberies, especially of arms depots.[21]

EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

Individual NAR members had informal connections to other countries, it is unclear whether the group received formal state support. There is murky evidence of international involvement in the bombing of the Bologna train station attributed to NAR. One NAR member arrested in the aftermath of the attack was the founder of the Italian-Libyan friendship society. A member of the French neo-fascist group European National Action Federation (FANE) was also arrested in the aftermath of the attack.[22]

Like other Italian neo-fascist terrorist groups, NAR took inspiration from other European right-wing groups and embraced some of the tenets of Germany's Nazi party.

TARGETS & TACTICS

NAR did not typically carry out the mass-casualty bombings associated with earlier right-wing groups, though it claimed responsibility for the 1980 bombing of a Bologna train station that killed 85 in the worst terrorist attack in Italian history.[23] NAR's overall tactical posture was one of "armed spontaneity" as opposed to organized violence. NAR was more likely to claim responsibility for attacks than previous right-wing groups were, under either its own name or the name Popular Revolutionary Movement (MPR), to give the impression of an ever-multiplying set of terrorist groups.[24]

NAR mostly used firearms and at times grenades to conduct raids or kill selected individuals including law enforcement officers, left-wing militants, and journalists.[25]

As in certain groups on the left in the second half of the 1970s, the ground-level fighter was considered the best judge of what action was required. Another left-wing tactic NAR imitated was that of claiming attacks under several different names to give the impression of an ever-multiplying set of terrorist groups.[26]

NAR began to target other right-wing militants as the right became the target of increasing arrests and militants increasingly cooperated with authorities. It especially targeted the leaders of the group Third Position, whom it believed to have misled and taken advantage of militant youth.[27]

MAJOR ATTACKS

1. December 24, 1977: NAR members wounded a leftist student in Rome. (0 killed, 1 wounded).[28]
2. January 9, 1979: NAR members attacked a left-wing radio station in Rome, wounding five station operators. (0 killed, 5 wounded).[29]
3. June 23, 1980: NAR members killed an assistant state attorney in Rome. The attorney had been investigating right-wing terrorism. (1 killed).[30]
4. August 2, 1980: NAR claimed responsibility for a bombing attack on Bologna's central train station. (85 killed, 200 wounded).[31]
5. October 21, 1981: NAR members killed two police officers in Rome. (2 killed).[32]
6. August 14, 1988: NAR members unsuccessfully attempted to bomb police headquarters in Milan. (0 killed.).[33]

RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER GROUPS

NAR members, like those of other right-wing groups, were largely disillusioned former members of the Italian right-wing party Italian Social Movement (MSI), particularly its student group University Front for National Action (FUAN).[34] MSI did not overtly support NAR, though it did encourage youth militancy.[35] NAR's membership included former members of the right-wing militant groups that had been banned in the mid-1970s.

NAR had wide-ranging contacts with other groups on the right. One of its goals was to unite militant right-wing groups under a single banner, and in that respect NAR resembled Prima Linea (PL), a left wing group that aimed to do the same for militant groups on the left.[36] It also encouraged other militants not formally affiliated with it to use its name to claim attacks, and itself used the name Popular Revolutionary Movement (MPR).
[37] It shared arms with other right-wing groups[38] and staged joint attacks, most notably with Let's Take Action.

NAR sought to forge alliances with militant groups on the left, at one point offering a formal ceasefire after attacking a left-wing radio station.[39] It was unsuccessful, however.

NAR began to attack other right-wing militants as the right became the target of increasing arrests and militants increasingly cooperated with authorities. It especially targeted the leaders of the group Third Position, whom it believed to have misled and taken advantage of militant youth.[40]

REFERENCES

1. ^ Pisano, Vittorfranco S. Terrorism and Security : the Italian Experience : Report of the Subcommittee On Security and Terrorism of the Committee On the Judiciary, United States Senate. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1984. p. 83.
2. ^ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Incident: 198808140002 Retrieved April 1, 2012 fromhttp://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198808140002.
3. ^ Pisano, Vittorfranco S. Terrorism In Italy : an Update Report, 1983-1985 : Report of the Subcommittee On Security and Terrorism for the Use of the Committee On the Judiciary, United States Senate.Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1985. p. 14.
4. ^ Sheehan, Thomas. Italy: Terror on the Right. New York Review of Books. January 22, 1981. Available:http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1981/jan/22/italy-terror-on-the-right/?pagination=false
5. ^ Ferraresi, Franco. Threats to Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996.
6. ^ Ferraresi, Franco. Threats to Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. p. 157.
7. ^ Ferraresi, Franco. Threats to Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. pp. 165-166.
8. ^ Ferraresi, Franco. Threats to Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. p. 159.
9. ^ Ferraresi, Franco. Threats to Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. p. 154.
10. ^ Ferraresi, Franco. Threats to Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. p. 183
11. ^ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Incident: 198808140002 Retrieved April 1, 2012 fromhttp://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198808140002.
12. ^ Weinberg, Leonard, and William Lee Eubank. The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. p. 48.
13. ^ Ferraresi, Franco. Threats to Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. pp. 165, 167. and Weinberg, Leonard, and William Lee Eubank. The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. p. 48.
14. ^ Weinberg, Leonard, and William Lee Eubank. The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. p. 48. and Ferraresi, Franco. Threats to Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. p. 165.
15. ^ Weinberg, Leonard, and William Lee Eubank. The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. p. 48.
16. ^ Ferraresi, Franco. Threats to Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. pp. 155, 157.
17. ^ Ferraresi, Franco. Threats to Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. p. 166.
18. ^ Ferraresi, Franco. Threats to Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. p. 157.
19. ^ Ferraresi, Franco. Threats to Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. p. 154.
20. ^ Ferraresi, Franco.Threats to Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. p. 167.
21. ^ Barbato, Tullio. Il Terrorismo In Italia Negli Anni Settanta : Cronaca E Documentazione. Milano: Bibliografica, 1980. p. 30
22. ^ Weinberg, Leonard, and William Lee Eubank. The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. p. 49.
23. ^ Sheehan, Thomas. Italy: Terror on the Right. New York Review of Books. January 22, 1981. Available:http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1981/jan/22/italy-terror-on-the-right/?pagination=false
24. ^ Pisano, Vittorfranco S. Terrorism and Security : the Italian Experience : Report of the Subcommittee On Security and Terrorism of the Committee On the Judiciary, United States Senate. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1984. p. 37 and Ferraresi, Franco. Threats to Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. p. 159.
25. ^ Pisano, Vittorfranco S. Terrorism and Security : the Italian Experience : Report of the Subcommittee On Security and Terrorism of the Committee On the Judiciary, United States Senate. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1984. pp. 37, 83.
26. ^ Ferraresi, Franco. Threats to Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. p. 159.
27. ^ Ferraresi, Franco. Threats to Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. p. 183.
28. ^ Pisano, Vittorfranco S. Terrorism and Security : the Italian Experience : Report of the Subcommittee On Security and Terrorism of the Committee On the Judiciary, United States Senate. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1984. p. 83.
29. ^ Pisano, Vittorfranco S. Terrorism and Security : the Italian Experience : Report of the Subcommittee On Security and Terrorism of the Committee On the Judiciary, United States Senate. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1984. p. 83.
30. ^ Pisano, Vittorfranco S. Terrorism and Security : the Italian Experience : Report of the Subcommittee On Security and Terrorism of the Committee On the Judiciary, United States Senate. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1984. p. 83.
31. ^ Sheehan, Thomas. Italy: Terror on the Right. New York Review of Books. January 22, 1981. Available:http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1981/jan/22/italy-terror-on-the-right/?pagination=false
32. ^ Pisano, Vittorfranco S. Terrorism and Security : the Italian Experience : Report of the Subcommittee On Security and Terrorism of the Committee On the Judiciary, United States Senate. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1984. p. 83.
33. ^ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Incident: 198808140002 Retrieved April 1, 2012 fromhttp://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=1988081400
34. ^ Weinberg, Leonard, and William Lee Eubank. The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. p. 46.
35. ^ Ferraresi, Franco. Threats to Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. p. 166.
36. ^ Ferraresi, Franco. Threats to Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. p. 166
37. ^ Pisano, Vittorfranco S. Terrorism and Security : the Italian Experience : Report of the Subcommittee On Security and Terrorism of the Committee On the Judiciary, United States Senate. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1984. p. 36. MPR may also have operated as an independent group; since NAR itself was not a formal structure, and right-wing militants often claimed membership in several groups at once, it is often difficult to distinguish groups from one another.
38. ^ Ferraresi, Franco. Threats to Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. p. 167
39. ^ Ferraresi, Franco. Threats to Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. p. 167.
40. ^ Ferraresi, Franco. Threats to Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. p. 183.

Stockholm Syndrome, Newtown and the Liberator Pistol

http://www.thetruthaboutguns.com/2012/12/jack-baruth/stockholm-syndrome-newtown-and-the-liberator-pistol/

Posted on December 26, 2012 by Jack Baruth

In his book “Blitzkrieg,” historian Len Deighton states that the Liberator program was canceled at the request of Charles de Gaulle, who as the self-appointed representative of the “Free French” had an amazing ability to manipulate the Allies towards his interest despite having virtually no followers and despite the fact that France itself didn’t exactly struggle to throw off the yoke of German occupation. De Gaulle knew that resistance to the Nazis was mostly imaginary, but that resistance to his triumphant return was likely to be quite real, particularly from leftist elements within France. He therefore convinced the United States to cancel any proposed Liberator drops and in doing so significantly reduced the amount of potentially-armed opposition to his postwar ascension.

The astute reader will note that this decision effectively aided the Nazi ability to resist the Normandy invasions. Some minor percentage of the deaths on that day was no doubt due to the fact that the Germans didn’t have a million zip guns pointed at their backs. The payoff for that sacrifice? When the country was liberated, nearly all the hardware was firmly in the hands of de Gaulle’s chosen people and the transition was no doubt smoothed by this happy coincidence. So what if a few Allied soldiers had to die in the cause?

Charles de Gaulle wasn’t just a brilliant politician; he was an effective myth-maker. The Allies sweated blood to put him into power at the end of World War II because he sold them a story that they wanted to believe, even if it wasn’t true: namely, that there had been a massive French Resistance and he, de Gaulle, had directed its many successful operations. The fiction of “Le Resistance” effectively over-wrote the fact of French cooperation. De Gaulle rode the power myth into a nearly absolute power over France.

The people who want to advance “reasonable” gun control in the United States are myth-makers, and they should not be confused with the useful idiots who subscribe to their myths. They know that a ten-round magazine limit or a ban on scary-looking pistol grips wouldn’t have prevented the deaths of those children in Connecticut. They know that nothing short of a nationwide ban on firearms possession, combined with a thorough and merciless seizure of the 300 million weapons in private hands already, could significantly reduce the chances of another Newtown shooting.

They don’t care. In the phrase “gun control”, control should be emphasized. Control is its own reward. Power, as Orwell noted, is its own reward. It needs no other reason, no other justification. There’s no reason to seek out the golden heart behind the iron fist of gun control. It doesn’t exist. The armed citizen is not fully under control, even if his “assault weapon” never leaves his closet. There must be control.

Media reflex

"I'm tired of the political debates," he added. "They're not necessary. I'm tired of the ideological positions. We don't even need to visit them. Let's stick to the pragmatic center where all Americans believe the same thing and let's pass legislation that would make America safer."

Your freedom is the problem.

Since your freedom imperials n>20 children you need to give up your rights since the social calculus has negated against your having them.

Jeff Cooper

deeman

8:53 PM CST

Jeff Cooper once said something that goes like this:

Guns are not evil, they have no morals good or bad. Now there are evil men who do have guns, but luckily there are more good men than evil. And while evil men might not be persuaded by education, religion and the media to be nice with their guns, good men with guns can certainly instruct them on the proper way to behave.

LRPD Helicopter Unit